# 1NC

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#### Interpretation and violation:

#### The resolutional actor is the USFG.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Its” means the aff must expand federal laws.

Updegrave ’91 [W.C.; August 19; Supreme Law.org, “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose,” <http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm>]

More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.

#### “Expanding” those laws sets a burden of materially altering them.

Hatter ’90 [Terry J Jr; March 20; January District Court Judge at the Central District of California; Westlaw, “In re Eastport Assocs.,” 114 B.R. 686]

Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal.App.3d 202, 211, 221 Cal.Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that “[t]he bill would expand the definition of development moratorium.” Senate Bill 186, Stats.1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22, 239 Cal.Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term “expand” indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

#### Analogies between limits and violent exclusion are faulty—argumentative exclusion is inevitable, but topicality ensures it occurs around reciprocal lines.

Anderson, 6—Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University (Amanda, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, 281-290, dml)

My recent book, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced—if misconceived—criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement—the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of [End Page 281] a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent—and in some versions, even celebratory—attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society.

One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos—specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers—was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.)

The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity—race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of [End Page 282] contingency—recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smith's portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples—and the larger claim they support—are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument.

Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly." This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies—to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference.

More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the [End Page 283] question of disagreement about what counts as argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist—and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics—that when they have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.

Robbins claims that I violate my own ideal of dialogue by failing to engage those who, according to him, are "[my] most significant antagonists": Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Rancière. But it is simply not true that I fail to address the fundamental concerns that neither of these thinkers owns in any absolute sense. I might have addressed their work particularly (there are significant differences between them), and I think the example of Rancière is a particularly fruitful one, especially given his own critique of sociological reductionism (and identity politics), and his universalism, which shares affinities with the forms of poststructuralist universalism (notably, Etienne Balibar's) that I address in the third chapter of my book. But the relevant issues of incommensurability of language games or cultural perspectives, and the question of intractable or "hardwired" exclusion, are adduced and repeatedly critiqued throughout the book, across a range of disciplines. The debate between the accommodationist position of Thomas McCarthy and the universalist position of Habermas addresses these issues straight on, and the discussion of Habermas clearly maps out the two main alternatives to his position as (1) incommensurable perspectives and (2) overlapping consensus. The analysis of Satya Mohanty and Martha Nussbaum is also directly relevant: Mohanty situates his project with respect to a well-known and parallel debate in anthropology represented by the opposed positions of Ernest Gellner and Talal Asad. My emphasis on the newer discussions of accommodation, [End Page 284] rather than the incommensurability theorists (e.g., Lyotard), is meant to argue for the Habermasian position against its newer and more interesting challengers, and I also wanted the book to move beyond the parochial reference points of literary and cultural studies to engage relevant work in political theory and political philosophy. And of course I do discuss the work of many influential theorists and literary critics who oppose the approach I take in the book generally. But I'm not going to reproduce my complete range of references: readers are free to decide for themselves how comprehensive and various the theoretical landscape is in my book. But I will say in response to Robbins that my "primary antagonist" considered as a position rather than a set of proper names is consistently present in the book, and taken on in a number of different ways.

There is a deeper issue at play in Robbins's invocation of Lyotard and Rancière, especially given where his discussion of what he calls my "argumentative normativity" ends up. On the one hand, Robbins wants to say that the argument I am taking up is no longer relevant, that "thankfully" literary critics have moved past the critique of Enlightenment. On this account I am sadly unaware that my earlier books have actually had some influence, and seem to be stuck in an agonistic position that has no traction, and that at this point constitutes a regression toward a naively pro-Enlightenment position that is likely to invite—and that at some level deserves to invite—a strong reiteration of the critique of Enlightenment. The moves need to be replayed in slow motion here to discover exactly what is going on, since the argument is quite kinetic, and involves a dubious framing of my own project. It is certainly the case that in diagnosing the state of academic argument in the humanities today, I invoke, as one of the contributing factors, the excesses involved in the critique of Enlightenment. It is not the only factor I invoke, but it is certainly adduced as a major contributing factor to the denigration of reason, critical distance, and formal argument. I do agree with Robbins that there are many critics challenging the critique of Enlightenment. There are also, as it happens, many critics who have walked away from the debate to do other things. But it remains the case, as Robbins's own response makes clear, that the stronger version of the critique has a kind of staying power, particularly as a way of asserting political pedigree in the last instance. Indeed, Robbins must insist that I resurrect a version of the very form of Enlightenment that was once the whipping boy of poststructuralism, in order to himself reintroduce a high-stakes political allegory that will imagine cultural criticism to be an immediate actor in the current international political landscape.

Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that [End Page 285] is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police.

Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off:

Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand.

Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak [End Page 286] about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

There is a way to make Robbins's point more narrowly, which would run something like this: Anderson has a very restricted notion of how argument should play out, or appear, within academic culture, given the heavy emphasis on logical consistency and normative coherence and explicitness. This conception of argument is too narrow (and hence authoritarian). To this I would reply simply that logical consistency and normative coherence and explicitness do not exhaust the possible forms, modes, and strategies of argumentation. There is a distinction to be made between the identification of moves that stultify or disarm argument, and an insistence on some sort of single manner of reasoned argument. The former I am entirely committed to; the latter not at all, despite the fact that I obviously favor a certain style of argument, and even despite the fact that I am philosophically committed to the claims of the theory of communicative reason. I do address the issue of diverse forms and modes of argument in the first and last chapters of the book (as I discuss above), but it seems that a more direct reflection on the book's own mode of argumentation might have provided the occasion for a fuller treatment of the issues that trouble Robbins.

Different genres within academe have different conventions, of course, and we can and do make decisions all the time about what rises to the level of cogency within specific academic venues, and what doesn't. Some of those judgments [End Page 287] have to do with protocols of argument. The book review, for example, is judged according to whether the reviewer responsibly represents the scholarship under discussion, seems to have a good grasp of the body of scholarship it belongs to, and convincingly and fairly points out strengths and weaknesses. The book forum is a bit looser—one expects responsible representation of the scholarship under discussion, but it can be more selectively focused on a key set of issues. And one expects a bit of provocation, in order to make the exchange readable and dramatic. But of course in a forum exchange there is an implicit norm of argument, a tendency to judge whether a particular participant is making a strong or a weak case in light of the competing claims at play. Much of our time in the profession is taken with judging the quality of all manner of academic performance, and much of it has to do with norms of argument, however much Robbins may worry about their potentially coercive nature.

From time to time I myself have wondered whether my book is too influenced by the modes of academe. But when I read a piece of writing like the one that Elspeth Probyn produced, I find myself feeling a renewed commitment to the evaluative norms of responsible scholarship, and to the idea that clearly agreed-upon genres and protocols of fair scholarship benefit from explicit affirmation at times. Probyn's piece does not conform at all to the conventions of the forum response. She may herself be quite delighted that it does not. Robbins may find himself delighted that she represents a viewpoint that does not agree on my (totalitarian) fundamentals of forum responses. But I would simply say that here we do not have fair or reasoned argument, which is one of the enabling procedures of forum exchanges. Indeed, I hear a different genre altogether: the venting phone call to a friend or intimate. In this genre, which I think we are all familiar with, one is not expected or required to give reasons or evidence, as one is in academic argument. Here's how the phone call might go: "Ugh. I have to write a response to this awful book. I agreed to this because I thought the book had an interesting title; it's called The Way We Argue Now. But I can't get through it; it isn't at all what I expected. I find myself alternately bored and irritated. It's so from the center—totally American parochial, and I just hate the style: polemical in a slam-bam-thank-you-ma'am way—really quite mean-spirited. She's so arrogant. And you wouldn't believe the so-called critique of Foucault. I don't know, I think I'm just sick of abstract theory—I mean, aren't we past this? It's so stultifying. I wish there were some way to get out of the commitment. I don't know how I'm ever going to get to it anyway, with all my journalism deadlines." The friend: "That sounds awful. But just use the occasion to write about something else, something you think is important. Write about yourself. Direct attention to a book that you do like. Whatever you do, don't spend too much time on it. And definitely call her out on the American centrism."

Do we really want to overhear this kind of conversation when we turn to the review section of a journal like Criticism? Of what intellectual value is it to know [End Page 288] Probyn's casual reactions to a book she won't bother responsibly to describe or engage, unless of course we accord to Probyn some sort of authority in advance that makes argument unnecessary. That she herself believes in such argument-by-authority is evident when she tells us, "As Stuart Hall would say, along with any undergraduate in my classes, 'A discourse is a group of statements that provide a language for talking about a particular kind of knowledge about a topic.'" This is the extent of Probyn's searing critique of the problem with advocating debate generally. But note that it relies, first, upon the invocation of an authority, Stuart Hall, and then upon the implication that her students have all entirely absorbed her own channeling of that authority. Probyn is entirely unbothered, moreover, that the undergraduates in her classes unblinkingly accept this empty statement without protest or challenge or further inquiry into its aimless specificity.

Probyn's piece is a mixture of affective fallacy, argument by authority, and bald ad hominem. There's a pattern here: precisely the tendency to personalize argument and to foreground what Wendy Brown has called "states of injury." Probyn says, for example, that she "felt ostracized by the book's content and style." Ostracized? Argument here is seen as directly harming persons, and this is precisely the state of affairs to which I object. Argument is not injurious to persons. Policies are injurious to persons and institutionalized practices can alienate and exclude. But argument itself is not directly harmful; once one says it is, one is very close to a logic of censorship. The most productive thing to do in an open academic culture (and in societies that aspire to freedom and democracy) when you encounter a book or an argument that you disagree with is to produce a response or a book that states your disagreement. But to assert that the book itself directly harms you is tantamount to saying that you do not believe in argument or in the free exchange of ideas, that your claim to injury somehow damns your opponent's ideas.

When Probyn isn't symptomatic, she's just downright sloppy. One could work to build up the substance of points that she throws out the car window as she screeches on to her next destination, but life is short, and those with considered objections to liberalism and proceduralism would not be particularly well served by the exercise. As far as I can tell, Probyn thinks my discussion of universalism is of limited relevance (though far more appealing when put, by others, in more comfortingly equivocating terms), but she's certain my critique of appeals to identity is simply not able to accommodate the importance of identity in social and political life. As I make clear throughout the book, and particularly in my discussion of the headscarf debate in France, identity is likely to be at the center of key arguments about life in plural democracies; my point is not that identity is not relevant, but simply that it should not be used to trump or stifle argument.

#### Debate is distinct from discussion due to its adversarial nature—we control uniqueness and the internal link is linear, multiple factors predispose us to avoiding clash, so you should seek to guarantee it as much as possible—the mere presence of limits or concessionary ground lapse into confirmation bias at best and mutual ignorance at worst. Centering debate on the instrumental consequences of the 1AC’s proposal solves.

Manin, 17—Professor of Politics, NYU (Bernard, “Political Deliberation & the Adversarial Principle,” Daedalus, Volume 146, Issue 3, Summer 2017, p.39-50, dml)

The idea of organizing collective deliberation as an adversarial debate, a debate for and against a position, is not new. It has its origins, or at least one of its early illustrations, in classical antiquity. Recent conceptions of deliberative democracy and the practices they have inspired (such as Deliberative Polls, citizens' juries, and consensus conferences) have led us to forget an older idea of political deliberation, formulated by Greek and Roman historians and theorists of rhetoric, from Herodotus to Quintilian via Thucydides, Aristotle, and Cicero. Today's conceptions of deliberative democracy put the emphasis on discussion, making it essential that the members of the deliberating group discuss among themselves, engage in dialogue, and exchange arguments with one another. The opposition of points of view, if mentioned, occupies a secondary place. It is viewed either as a precondition to deliberation proper or simply as a natural consequence of pluralistic societies in which the expression of opinions is free. Yet in the ancient idea of deliberation, the opposition of points of view occupied a central place. To simplify, in the ancient conception, orators advocating opposed policies each presented arguments in favor of their position and against their opponent's. These arguments were presented before an assembly that subsequently decided on the policy. It seems reasonable to assume that members of the assembly also discussed the arguments among themselves. But the opposition of points of view – not mutual discussion – constituted the motor and chief element of deliberation.

It is in this way, for example, that Thucydides presents the major scenes of deliberation in The Peloponnesian War: the debate at Sparta about the decision to enter the war, the Athenian debate over the punishment to inflict on the inhabitants of Mytilene between Cleon and Diodotus, and the debate in the Athenian assembly over the Sicilian expedition where Nicias and Alcibiades confronted one another.1 In these scenes, the orators who advance opposing points of view do not discuss among themselves and do not seek to persuade their opposition. Rather, they seek to convince the assembly to whom they address their speeches. Thucydides presents these scenes as deliberations of the assembly. At various points in his account of the debate over Mytilene, he refers to it as “deliberation.”2 In such deliberation, the driving element is the hearing of opposed persuasive speeches. Similarly, on several occasions in Politics, Aristotle indicates that the task of the assembly is to deliberate on common affairs.3 In Rhetoric, we find a more precise description of the assembly's deliberative activity: orators arguing for and against the decisions being contemplated.4 Here, as well, the orators speak, offering opposed opinions and arguments, but the citizens deliberate. In a scene of deliberation among the Persians recounted in The Histories, Herodotus reflects on the benefits expected from the method of opposed speeches. “If opinions contrary to one another have not been expressed,” he has Artabanus explain, “it is not possible to choose the one which it is best to adopt.”5 Note that this argument is purely epistemic: to hear contrary opinions is necessary for discovering the right answer. No consideration of fairness enters. The importance of the adversarial principle in the ancients appears not only in theoretical writings; we also find its reflection in institutional practices. To wit, after the oligarchical revolutions and the restoration of democracy at the start of the fourth century bce, the Athenians adopted two institutions that mandated a for-and-against debate: the graphè paranomon and the nomothetai.6 The graphè paranomon authorized a decision already voted on by the assembly to be brought before the courts (in which the judges were ordinary citizens selected by lot) on the grounds that the decision was contrary to the law or simply harmful to the Athenian people. The plaintiff and the citizen who had proposed the contested decree would then plead their cases before the courts. The decree was annulled if the verdict went in favor of the accusation. Any of the assembly's decisions could thereby be submitted to a sort of second reading before the courts. However, this second reading, which possessed greater authority than the first, needed to include an adversarial debate, while the first examination by the assembly might have proceeded without oppositions. The institution of the nomothetai illustrates even more clearly the benefits expected from the use of the adversarial method in the political realm. Here, the action did not unfold before the courts, and there was neither plaintiff nor defendant. The adversarial form, nevertheless, was maintained. Whenever it seemed desirable to abrogate and replace certain laws, proposals for new laws were put forth and announced in public venues in advance. These proposals were then defended before the nomothetai by their initiators. At the same time, five citizens were elected for the purpose of defending the existing laws whose abrogation had been proposed. The institutions of the nomothetai and the graphè paranomon were adopted as means for protecting the newly restored democracy from the impassioned and hasty decisions from which the city had suffered, especially during the Peloponnesian War. To protect against this outcome, Athenian democrats turned to institutions that conferred the most authoritative decisions on groups of citizens who would necessarily have heard the arguments for and against the measures under consideration. Just because the ancients conceived of political deliberation as a confrontation between opposing views is not, in itself, a reason for adopting their models. All that history can do is open us to perspectives we perhaps would not have otherwise thought of. We must now ask ourselves why it might be desirable to organize political deliberation according to the principle of hearing both sides. I see four principal reasons for doing so: 1) Improving the quality of collective decisions 2) Counteracting the fragmentation of the public sphere 3) Facilitating the comprehension of choices 4) Treating the minority with respect.

Let us begin with improving the quality of collective decisions. A long tradition of thought, including, in particular, the reflections of John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper, has highlighted what we can call the epistemic virtues of criticism. Several arguments have shown that to submit an idea to criticism constitutes one of the best means of testing its validity. This holds for practical ideas. A decision is more likely to be of a high quality – whether in factual and technical terms, or in terms of values – if the proposals for action have been submitted to criticism beforehand. Criticism permits the elimination, or at least the reduction, of proposals involving false factual beliefs, logical errors, or objectionable moral choices. We do not need to repeat here the arguments establishing the epistemic merits of criticism. No one today would deny that criticism is one of the best means at our disposal to test the quality, technical and moral, of practical proposals.

Nevertheless, the conclusion that we generally draw from these arguments is that it is enough simply to establish the freedom to express criticism to produce its benefits. This is without doubt how Mill reasoned. We find an even more striking expression of this position in the famous free-speech dissent of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Men, he wrote, will eventually realize “that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”7 Yet the conclusion that the free exchange of ideas is a sufficient guarantee is not justified. Freedom of speech on its own does not ensure that the right to criticize will be exercised. Furthermore, as we shall see, the fact that criticisms are put forward does not guarantee that they will receive proper consideration.

Several mechanisms can prevent the ability to criticize freely from leading to its exercise. I group these together here under the label of conformism. Social psychology has long told us (with elaboration in Rousseau) that people want to be liked. Being esteemed and approved of by others also provides a gratifying image of one's self. It follows that when people perceive that, in a given social environment, others' opinions lean in a certain direction, they tend to bend their own expressions in the same direction to gain the approval of their peers. They avoid expressing dissenting or critical views, reinforcing the mechanism of the “spiral of silence.”8 Even in the context of discussion, we observe the disposition to conform to what is perceived as the norm within the group. This phenomenon is at the heart of what has been named, since the works of psychologist Serge Moscovici, the polarizing effect of group discussions.9 Thus, even if criticism is formally free, a powerful social force works to marginalize, or even to stifle, its expression.

Contrary to what liberal theorists often affirm, social or cultural diversity within a group does not suffice to assure a confrontation of opinions critically opposed to one another. Suppose, for example, a deliberating body whose members, while being diverse with regard to social position, education, and beliefs, also share a fear of some danger. Let us imagine, furthermore, that this assembly discusses a measure that would contribute to the reduction of this danger; for example, strengthening the powers of the police. In this context, it is unlikely that collective deliberation will bring forth many arguments against the adoption of this measure, however much social or cultural diversity there may be in the group. Rather, the discussion will produce an accumulation of reasons in favor of increased police power, with various members finding, from within their own particular perspectives, diverse reasons for adopting this course of action that others, differently situated, may not have seen on their own. Yet even if increasing the prerogatives of the police did, in fact, contribute to the realization of the desired end, the measure might also present undesirable effects or features in other ways. Collective deliberation should precisely bring to light these potential negative effects and weigh them in the balance against the benefits of the measure. But in our case, the assembly will systematically underestimate these possible negative features even though members of the assembly have the liberty to oppose the measure and criticize one another.

It appears, then, that if one wants to obtain from political deliberation the favorable epistemic effects of criticism, the expression of opposing opinions must be encouraged, not merely permitted.

But there is another reason to ensure that the participants in a deliberation are actually confronted with opposing points of view; it concerns the reception of arguments, rather than their production. Studies in social and cognitive psychology show that, confronted with new information or evidence, people have a systematic propensity to see in it a confirmation of their previous beliefs. In a now-classic experiment, psychologists presented the same ensemble of documents and studies concerning the death penalty and its effects to two groups of subjects selected on the basis of their antecedent opinions: one group composed of subjects favorable to the death penalty, the other subjects who are rather hostile to it. After being confronted with these documents, the group that was favorable to the death penalty became more favorable to it, and the group hostile to it became still more hostile.10 This phenomenon is particularly marked when the documents presented to the subjects were ambiguous and called for interpretation. The propensity to find support for one's antecedent beliefs is known as “confirmation bias.”11 Research has also shown that group discussion reinforces the effects of confirmation bias. Groups interpret information with more bias than do individuals; and they privilege information that supports their antecedent beliefs to an even greater degree than do individuals.12 Two mechanisms explain this tendency. First, as noted earlier, group settings accentuate tendencies that predominate among individuals. If privileging information supportive of prior beliefs is already the dominant tendency among individuals, it is not surprising that this tendency should be amplified in group discussion. But a second, and more surprising, mechanism is also at work. It seems that groups tend to discuss principally the information that was already known to all the members before the beginning of the discussion. Within groups, it turns out, discussion turns essentially on shared knowledge. Members of the group are reluctant to discuss those bits of information that are known only to one or a few other members prior to the discussion.13 Shared information appears to have more weight in the eyes of the group members, and has a greater chance of being mentioned during the discussion, and thus remembered later.14 Finally, information supporting the position preferred by the greatest number of group members has a greater likelihood of becoming the object of discussion than information supporting the contrary position.15 Collective discussion thus tends to produce a disproportionate volume of information and arguments in favor of the already-dominant belief in the group.

If one wishes to check the effects of confirmation bias – a phenomenon to which groups are particularly vulnerable – one must take proactive measures. One can, for example, call special attention to arguments contrary to prior beliefs by highlighting them (literally) or by making them cognitively more salient. Not only is the free expression of a multiplicity of voices not sufficient to assure the confrontation of opposing views, but the mere expression of contrary arguments is not sufficient for others to understand those arguments or consider them objectively.

In the absence of measures that actively induce individuals to pay particular attention to evidence and points of view opposed to their own, collective deliberation will have the greatest likelihood of simply reinforcing antecedent opinions. In a political deliberation, in short, we cannot expect that the gathering of diverse points of view will spontaneously produce a clash of arguments pro and contra, nor that it will bring about a balanced consideration of views. Mill was wrong to assume that, in a society or an assembly composed of diverse members, opposing opinions would already be there, waiting to be set against one another once they were allowed to be uttered. Mill wrote: “The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at the canonization of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a ‘devil's advocate.'”16 He failed to see that the presence of a devil's advocate was required, not merely admitted. And through the requirement, the Church secured that objections to the canonization of a given person were aired and considered, even if no individual would otherwise have spontaneously offered them.17

The confrontation of opposing opinions also has merit beyond eliciting unshared perspectives. It unifies the field in which opinions are formed and expressed, counteracting the fragmentation of the public sphere. In order to be opposed to an opinion and to contest it, it is necessary that one be cognizant of that opinion and take it into consideration. In a society in which points of view are objectively diverse, the open and explicit clash of opposing ideas is neither the natural state nor the sole possible condition. Another configuration is just as likely: mutual ignorance. The German sociologist Georg Simmel therefore argued that conflict between social groups paradoxically served the cause of social integration: first, by placing the conflicting groups into a relationship with one another and, second, by exerting a pressure for unity among the secondary divisions within each group. We can advance a similar argument in matters of opinion. The clash of opinions unifies the field in which beliefs confront one another, creating a space in which those beliefs are addressed to and respond to one another. This task of mutual addressing is harder when the space of opinions is fragmented into a multitude of islets, homogenous within themselves but formed in conditions of little communication with outsiders.

Several factors – some older, some of more recent origin – now trend in the direction of this sort of fragmentation. First, we have long known that people are selective in their choice of contacts and social relations. They tend disproportionately to be in contact with people who share their political opinions.18 Psychologically, many fear the face-to-face expression of political disagreement and want to avoid it as much as possible.

More recent factors also work in the direction of fragmentation: the development of cable television and its thematic stations, the spread of the Internet, and finally the movement toward residential and territorial segregation. Although the effects of these transformations are still difficult to estimate, they all present an analogous structure: people are now offered, in multiple ways, greater opportunities for communicating and coming into contact only with other individuals like themselves.

Cable television and the rise of opinion-based television stations (a phenomenon currently more pronounced in the United States than in Europe) provide viewers with the possibility of receiving a high proportion of their information only from a channel to which they feel ideologically close. Worse still, cable TV allows individuals with little interest in politics to avoid political news altogether and watch only entertainment programs.19 For its part, the Internet has dramatically increased the number and types of people with whom one can enter into contact. But studies on the usage of the Web suggest that contacts and links are established primarily through personal affinities, and in particular through ideological affinities within the political domain. Progressive blogs and forums link to other progressive sites but not to conservative sites, and vice versa. From these islets and networks of like-minded individuals we can expect the increased effects of reinforcement and polarization, because, in general, interacting with people of similar beliefs pushes one more toward the extreme positions of the views common to the group.20 Finally, the movement toward residential segregation, which has already progressed in the United States and is at work today in Europe, further contributes to the fragmentation of the public space of communication. If it is true that opinions are strongly correlated with sociocultural and ethnic factors, then in a neighborhood whose inhabitants share the same sociocultural or ethnic profile, each person is likely, for the most part, to encounter neighbors who share the same opinions. A selective exposure to similar opinions emerges de facto.

Faced with these forces of fragmentation, only intentional collective action can be expected to produce a degree of unification of the public political sphere. This second justification for the deliberate encouragement of adversarial political debates is particularly salient today.

True, adversarial debate is by nature reductive. Faced with some political problem, the polity usually has a multitude of possible courses of action, not all of which will be mutually exclusive. Yet the reductive character of the adversarial method is also one of its merits. It simplifies complexity, making the choices easier to grasp. There is no doubt, for example, that the current economic situation in Europe and the United States calls for a range of measures that are more or less intermingled and complementary to one another. To obtain a synoptic view of these measures and their relations and to choose among them would require considerable cognitive effort. There are cognitive advantages to presenting the policy response as a choice between reducing public deficits now and maintaining or increasing these deficits in the short term to prevent further decline until the economy has regained its normal growth rate. As democrats, we cannot discount the value of such cognitive simplicity. Groups of experts may be able to deliberate without using the adversarial method. But if we want ordinary (or even well-informed) citizens to participate ably in collective deliberation, the simplification achieved by the adversary system is an almost indispensable instrument.

The fourth principle in support of the adversarial method is the value of treating the minority with respect. No matter how conscientiously citizens deliberate, it is likely that disagreement will remain at the end of the process. Decisions will therefore be taken by the majority. The majority of people will get to live with the decision they desired; a minority of people will have to live under a decision they did not support. To be sure, the decision itself formed the minority: it did not exist per se before the vote. But the manner of conducting the deliberation before the vote entails consequences for the treatment of those who, after the vote, will make up the minority.

If the deliberation has been conducted as a debate between opposed positions, with each camp presenting its reasons in favor of its position and criticizing those advanced by the opposition, two consequences follow. After a vote has been taken, the minority must obey the decision, but at least the reasons aiming to justify this decision will have been formulated and made public. The minority might still refuse to listen to these reasons seriously and in good faith, but it was given the chance to consider them. The minority members were therefore treated with the respect owed to autonomous beings. Once children have reached the age of autonomy, parents must justify the orders they give them. When they are not yet autonomous, children must obey orders simply because they are orders. So, too, if the minority members have not had the possibility of hearing the reasons for the decision they must obey against their wishes, they are placed in a situation of having to obey the order simply because it is an order, or simply because it obtained the most votes. I do not mean to imply that the members of the minority will consequently be more disposed to obey the decision. Sometimes justifications exacerbate the opposition. But justifying orders shows greater respect for the autonomy of those receiving them.

On the flip side, the reasons for not taking the decision that ultimately triumphed would also have been put forward. These criticisms and objections did not prevail, but they were at least articulated and made public. From the majority's perspective, because it won, it will naturally think that it was right; but in the process, it had to listen to the opposition explaining their justification. The members of the majority were at minimum forced to see that there were reasons supporting the other side. It seems reasonable to think that, as a result, the majority will be less inclined to consider the minority as unintelligent or ill-intentioned.

Before I proceed to the practical consequences that we can draw from my argument, I must first respond to an objection: that rendering obligatory the presentation of opposing points of view in the public sphere would require constraints on public discourse and encroachments on freedom of speech. In response to this objection I would first suggest turning to an institution that in the relatively recent past followed just this path: the fairness doctrine in effect in the United States from 1927 to 1987. The fairness doctrine, implemented by the Federal Communications Commission, made it obligatory for radio and television stations to give an evenly balanced presentation of “opposing viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance.” The fairness doctrine not only imposed equality in airtime; it also required the presentation of viewpoints opposed to one another. The doctrine did not apply to airtime during electoral campaigns, which was regulated on other terms. It applied instead to any question that became the object of public controversy outside of electoral periods. The constitutionality of this doctrine was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous 1969 decision of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.21 The central argument that the Court invoked in support of the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine was that, in regard to liberty of expression on the airwaves, it is “the right of the viewing and listening public, and not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” The Court thus held that listeners and viewers had the right to hear conflicting viewpoints in order to make up their mind on the issues: “Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”22 The fairness doctrine was abandoned for two reasons. First, the doctrine led radio and television stations to avoid controversial subjects for the sake of not exposing themselves to lawsuits claiming they had violated the law. Second, the question of what exactly constituted the opposition of one point of view against another became the subject of repeated litigation, and the fcc proved unable to reduce the insecurity and juridical uncertainty that arose on this front. Despite its eventual abandonment, however, the Red Lion decision shows that the obligation for the media to present conflicting viewpoints is compatible with a certain interpretation of freedom of speech in the public sphere, an interpretation that focuses on the rights of the receiving public. That the U.S. Supreme Court has since rejected this interpretation does not mean that the arguments advanced in Red Lion were objectively weak. They are, in any case, consistent with the claims of this essay. What, then, should we do in practice to foster the confrontation of opposing arguments in today's democracies? Without claiming to provide a complete and detailed response to this question, I will conclude by suggesting two concrete means for promoting the adversarial principle in politics. The first is a practice yet to be invented, which would be implemented outside of electoral periods. The second consists of reinforcing a practice already used in electoral campaigns. First, my suggestion for the future. Outside of electoral periods, civil-society actors (such as foundations or think tanks) could organize adversarial debates on subjects of public interest. These debates would not be regularly scheduled, but would be organized only when a question sparked significant interest from the public (as with such topics as nuclear energy, assisted suicide, or, in certain countries, the wearing of the hijab) or when a large number of citizens mobilized in favor of a cause. More generally, these public debates would not aim to replace any existing democratic practices (such as electoral campaigns or parliamentary debates), but would complement them.

Neither the exposition of conflicting viewpoints nor communication across ideological divides can be made mandatory. This does not mean that it is useless to try to facilitate them. Indeed, the probability of being confronted with opposing points of view matters: it tends to make one's thoughts more anticipatory, careful, and subtle.23 In contemporary circumstances, this probability tends to diminish. The active promotion of adversarial debates aims to counteract this pernicious tendency.

Given that the goal of these debates would be to further the formulation and diffusion of arguments for and against a given public decision, they should be guided by the following principle: speakers should defend or criticize a given policy or position only with reference to its own merits, and not in response to reasons external to the policy or position. The arguments advanced in these debates should concern the advantages or disadvantages – whether technical or moral – inherent in the decision. I call this the principle of relevant reasons. This principle has two implications: the first concerns simplifying the debate to one issue; the second concerns choosing the right participants.

In order to encourage citizens to take account of and weigh the reasons for and against a given decision, each question that can be defined objectively and independent from other questions should be debated separately. Multidimensionality and the bundling of different questions undermine the coherence of the arguments.

To be sure, at election time, the voter will vote for a candidate or party that has bundled questions without an objective connection between them. Such grouping may be desirable, because it permits negotiations between different strands of the party. Nevertheless, to understand the bundling and negotiation well enough to cast an informed vote, the voter needs to have thought through the different issues separately, aided by adversarial debate.

It is probably too difficult to completely exclude nonrelevant reasons – that is, reasons not substantively linked to the policy in question – at the moment of organizing a deliberative debate. But the principle remains valid: nonrelevant arguments should be sidelined as much as possible. As a consequence, each debate should focus on a specific theme, rather than on platforms comprising multiple dimensions.

The other implication of the principle of relevant reasons concerns the choice of participants. Speakers should be permitted to defend policies that promote their own interests, but only on the condition that their interests be both publicly declared and linked to the substance of the policy they recommend – not to external interests like advancing their careers or promoting objectives that have no connection with the policy under debate. Speakers should thus mainly be experts, representatives of associations, activists, and persons enjoying a recognized moral authority. Politicians might participate so long as that participation satisfies the principle of relevant reasons: namely, that they address themselves solely to the question under debate, to the exclusion of other themes in the platform of their party. Their professional and career prospects should play no role in these debates.

## 2

**Collapse is not inevitable, cap’s the only option, political change is in the right direction, alt solvency is myopic and collapse turns it.**

**Teixeira and Judis, 17**—senior fellow at both The Century Foundation and American Progress AND editor-at-large at Talking Points Memo, former senior writer at The National Journal and a former senior editor at The New Republic (Ruy and John, “Why The Left Will (Eventually) Triumph: An Interview With Ruy Teixeira,” <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/why-left-will-eventually-win-ruy-teixeira>, dml)

Judis: In your book, you explain at several points that you are no longer a socialist and instead support a reformed capitalism. When we met many years ago, we were in a socialist organization. When did this transformation occur?

Teixeira: What happened is that I began to think a lot about how economies actually work. When I was a socialist, I **didn’t think very carefully** and **long** about what **actually** a socialist economy would look like. I had this **general idea** that the capitalist system was **inefficient** and **prone to crisis** and that one should **somehow tamp down the profit motive** and limit the freedom of action of capitalists. But **the more I thought** about how economies worked, it was **hard to gainsay** that the market was **absolutely essential** for the efficient delivery of goods and services. And the more I read, the more I realized my viewpoint was closer to social democrats than to socialists. Capitalism needs to be **regulated**, it needs to be **pointed in the right direction**, you **need to have a big safety net**, but you **can’t replace it**.

Judis: Was there something that happened, a book you read, that changed your mind?

Teixeira: I would say it was an obscure book by Alec Nove called “The Economics of Feasible Socialism.”

Judis: That’s amazing. I was deeply influenced by the same book.

Teixeira: Nove was a historian of the Soviet Union. He came from a Menshevik family, and he basically laid out the way the standard conceptions of socialism that a lot of people on the left had couldn’t work. If you wanted to **think rationally about what’s feasible**, the way economies and people tend to work, you **had to have a market**.

The goal as I see it is a mixed economy that works as well as possible, and of course you have not gotten that in the West for the last several decades. The mixed economy just needs improvement and modification.

Judis: And what kind of improvements would that be?

Teixeira; I favor what economists are calling a model of **equitable growth**. It would mean **substantial government investment** in creating new opportunities for the middle and aspirational classes. It could include a **dramatic expansion of the educational system** and a Manhattan-style investment in bringing down the price of clean energy and building the infrastructure to match. Granted, these kind of proposals would not get through Congress now, but it is the kind of agenda that I am optimistic that the Democrats will endorse and that the country will **eventually embrace**.

The Left Prospers in Prosperity

Judis: Your book is titled “The Optimistic Leftist,” but if you look at the terrain of politics today, the center-left or left of center parties are decimated. The Democrats haven’t been in such bad shape nationally and in the states since the 1920s. The Dutch Labor Party got less than 10 percent in the recent election. Jeremy Corbyn and British Labor may be routed in June. The French Socialist candidate came in fifth with 6 percent. Why is this happening? And given that this is happening, what grounds do you have for thinking that the left will suddenly find itself on top?

Teixeira: The way I look at it we are going through a **long transition** from an industrial capitalist system to a **post-industrial services-based capitalist system**. So far this transition has **not gone well**. It hasn’t had the outcomes that people want. We have **slow productivity growth** and **rising inequality**. The central point I’d make is that **by and large**, **poor economic times** are **not good for the left**. They **make people reactive**, **pessimistic**, **trying to hold onto their own**, and **not supportive of collective endeavors** to help the way society functions. And we’ve seen all that in spades in the last decade.

Really that kind of situation is **best for the right**, and the left has had a very difficult time figuring out a way forward. The Democrats have their problems, but in Europe, you see the problems crystallized. Europe’s mainstream left was based in the industrial working class and has had a terrible time adjusting to the transition to post-industrial capitalism and figuring out what a new model of capitalism and capitalist growth would look like.

They have thrown in their lot with a much more right-wing approach, beginning with the Third Way in the ’90s. The idea behind it was that capitalism can pretty well function on its own and we just have to let it rip. We’re still coming out of that phase, and I think the mainstream social democrats with their collaboration with austerity in places like France and the Netherlands are reaping the whirlwind.

But if you look at other parts of the left, they are actually doing relatively well. If you look at the Netherlands election, the green left did very well, and if you add up the votes of the Socialist Party (a left-socialist party), the greens, Democrats 66 (a left social-liberal party) and the social democrats, the left **hasn’t been totally decimated**. What has really been decimated is the Party of Labor, as the social democrats in the Netherlands are called. We are seeing the same thing in France where the Socialist Party (the French social democrats) candidate did terribly, but [independent socialist Jean-Luc] Melenchon did quite well. The left **still has strength**, but it is **divided up among different political tendencies**. It is going to have to **reorganize itself around an economic program** that is going to deliver what people want, which is **better growth** and **better distribution**. Until that happens, the left will be **in a quagmire**.

Judis: I want to look more closely at your argument that the left does better in good times and the right in bad times. Bill Clinton got elected in the wake of a recession in 1992, Barack Obama might not have won the presidency in 2008 if the financial crash hadn’t happened that September. The Populists came out of the farm crisis in 1880s and early 1890s; the New Deal out of the Great Depression. I am not saying that bad times is better for the left, but only that there isn’t a necessary connection in either case and that you are making too facile an assumption about which times promote which politics.

Teixeira: Bad times do propel people into motion and produce protest and reaction, but looked at from when you can accomplish the goals of the left of **making society better** and **implementing important reforms**, I think it is **typically easier** when the economy is **expanding fairly rapidly** and **living standards are going up** than when the reverse is true. It is **not a perfect relationship**, but **by and large** I think it’s true. So yeah, Obama can get elected in a situation where he was aided by an economic downturn, but his ability to **put together a progressive coalition** that could **stick together for a long time** and continue to implement reforms was **very much undermined by the economic situation**.

Judis: Let’s turn it around and look at the connection between the right and good and bad times. In America, the 1920s were relatively good times, and the Republicans controlled the government the whole decade.

Teixeira: The 1920s were not nearly as good a time people think it was. It was a time of relatively slow per capita income growth. It was very unequally distributed, the industrial working class did somewhat well, but the rural areas did poorly, and there were four recessions between 1918 and 1929. It was not such a great time. It was relatively poor compared to the Progressive Era.

Judis: So the Republicans did well in the 1920s because they were really bad times?

Teixeira: There was a sense of real uncertainty, real economic paranoia.

Judis: I don’t think you could call the 1920s bad times. You could call it uneven times. “Bad times” is stretching it. In addition, you have the real bad times of the Depression staring you in your face which is the time of the greatest advance in terms of a left and social democracy in our history.

Teixeira: Desperate times make for desperate measure sometimes. There is **no guarantee they will help the left rather than the right**. I think that’s what we saw in the U.S. Obviously it didn’t work out so well in Europe. When I make the general analysis that the left is better off in a period of economic expansion and rising living standards, it doesn’t correspond exactly to the political outcomes you’ll have in those different periods. I am saying that **in a general sense**, the left has the **easiest time making advances** and **improving society** when things are going well **rather than when are going poorly**.

Judis: Let’s look at Europe. In some of the countries in Northern Europe that are doing well, the center-right parties are in charge.

Teixeira: Yes, but I think you can make the case the center-right parties aren’t exactly in charge in Europe. They also have their problems. The rise of populism in Europe is blowing apart the party system.

Judis: You have got Holland, Denmark, Germany, and Austria. Those are all countries that are doing pretty well compared to the rest of the EU and that have center-right governments.

Teixeira: The Netherlands is not doing that well. It’s all relative. Their recovery has been somewhat better. Their employment level has been high compared to other European countries, but there are a number of cuts in social services, wages haven’t been going up much, there is a lot more insecurity.

Judis: Isn’t Germany doing well?

Teixeira:. Germany is doing relatively well, but it hasn’t been a period of expansive growth for them either. There is a lot of wage stagnation and compression there. I **never meant to imply** that you can **perfectly predict social reform from economic outcomes**. But I think it **provides an important lens** on when the left does well and when the left does poorly. By and large when you look at Europe, you see the ~~straitjacket~~ [**dilemma**] that the Eurozone has created in the economies. People are **fearful**, they are **pessimistic**, they are **passive**. This is **very bad for the left**. Until you **break out** of that [dilemma] ~~straitjacket~~, the left is **not going to be able to do that well**, and the right is **going to continue to do relatively well** compared to them, and you’ll see the **continued rise in populism** because people have no faith in the system. So what I am trying to do is to get the left to focus on **getting to a new stage of capitalist growth** and **being able actually to deliver rising incomes**.

There is No Alternative to the Left

Judis: So let’s talk about how this political change will come about. What I took from your book is that we are currently suffering from secular stagnation, and that to get to a new stage of growth, we will have to implement the kind of left program that you describe. I worry that this argument contains a contradiction. On the one hand, the left can’t get its program enacted as long as times are bad. On the other hand, the only way to get out of bad times is for the left to get its program enacted.

Teixeira: I see what you are asking. I think it is going to be **two steps forward**, **one step back**. We are sort of **slouching** toward the next stage of capitalism. I **don’t think it’s going to be pretty**. Political and economic factors are going to propel us in that direction. Ultimately, people want things to work better, they want their problems to be solved. And the **only way** we are going to get there is along the road I have described. I think this **equitable growth** approach that the Democrats united around is the future. The level of growth is going to vary over time, but I think the Democrats are the ones who are going to put us there and I think they are going to be rewarded for it.

Judis:. But how does that happen? Isn’t there a crisis scenario implicit in your account? At some time, the current Third Way or neoliberal approach results in another Great Recession and at that point people will buy into a left-wing approach, the left-wing approach will create prosperity and at that time we will have an enduring left-wing or Democratic majority. Isn’t a step like this missing from your argument?

Teixeira:. That certainly could be the way it goes down, but it’s **not clear we are required to have a recession** on the level we did in 2007 and 2008, or whether this sort of rolling crisis we have combined with other political events might do it. I don’t know, it’s hard to predict, but I think the great economist Herbert Stein said, if something cannot go on forever, it will stop.

Judis: The great socialist Rosa Luxembourg said the choice was socialism or barbarism. I am not saying we are heading toward barbarism, but I think there is a determinism in your argument. I think you are saying that people will eventually choose a politics that will best help them. Reason will prevail. And I am not sure if that holds up historically. When you talk about the EU, you say eventually they will consolidate into a fiscal monetary union. I am not sure that is going to happen. It’s also possible that the Eurozone could break up and that there could be a lot of chaos. We have periods in history where things don’t happen in the best of all possible ways.

Teixeira: The trajectory is **ultimately going to take us** to a **different** and **better place**. I think **eventually we will adapt** and we will **get something better** than we have because it is the **only solution to the ongoing problems**. **There is no alternative**.

Judis: Countries are sometime structurally unable to do what is in their best interest. In the U.S., we have this strong anti-statist tradition going back to the revolution that seems to get in the way every time we want to do something like what you are proposing. It is possible that contrary to Hegel, the rational won’t turn out to be the real.

Teixeira: Of course it is possible, but if you look at the history of the United States, **despite the anti-statist bias** and **despite all the other political problems**, the way the country has evolved over time is toward a **larger government** that **does more** and **provides more for people**. And we **obviously have evolved tremendously** in the social realm as well. Governments don’t do what is rational in the short term, at least rational in the sense you are describing it, but political systems **evolve over time** in a way that is consistent with the values and priorities of the left, and I expect that to continue over time.

The 2016 Election

Judis: Let’s talk about the 2016 election. Why did Clinton lose to such a weak opponent?

Teixeira: The Democrats have an evolving majority that consists of groups like minorities, professionals, young people, single women and what have you, and that’s a true fact. It’s growing over time and it will continue to grow, but it was always mathematically true that if you take the declining group, the white non-college voters, and they move sufficiently in the direction of the other party, that will be enough to undermine your coalition. You won’t win. That’s exactly what happened in 2016. These voters moved rapidly away from the Democrats both in local and state races and in the presidential election.

Judis: Why did they move?

Teixeira: They do not have any faith that the Democrats share their values and are going to deliver a better life for them and their kids, and I think Hillary Clinton was a very efficient bearer of that meme. Whether she wanted to or not, the message she sent to these voters is that you are really not that important and I don’t take your problems seriously, and frankly I don’t have much to offer you. And that’s despite the fact that her economic program and policies would have actually been very good for these people. There was a study of campaign advertising in 2016 that showed Hillary outspent Trump significantly and that almost none of her advertising was about what she would actually do. Almost all of it was about how he was a bad dude.

Voters were **fed up with stagnation** and with the Democrats and they **turned to someone who thought could blow up the system**. The way the Democrats and the left could **mitigate that problem** is to show these voters that they **take their problems seriously** and have their interests in mind, and could improve their lives. I **don’t think there is any way of doing that** without a **new model of economic growth**.

#### The spread of capitalism causes world peace!

Mousseau, 19—Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (Michael, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace,” International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, Summer 2019, p.160-196, dml)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3

This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers.

I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of self-determination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin's Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6

To support my theory that domestic factors determine states' alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I find that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states' interest in the global market order by finding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker.

Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states' behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other's regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

#### Capitalism encourages contractualist governance, which is making war impossible. The only threat is economic collapse.

Mousseau, 19—Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (Michael, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace,” International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, Summer 2019, p.160-196, dml)

If my argument is correct, the world is on the cusp of tremendous change: across the globe, contractualism is overtaking status-personalism and, in so doing, launching an era of peace and prosperity. This conclusion is reached without any monotonic or teleological assumptions: anything that collapses the contractualist economies for a generation or two would stop or reverse this trend.81 All else being equal, the contractualist hegemony has made the odds of unit-level change from a status to a contractualist economy more likely than the reverse. At the start of the twentieth century, only the United States had a contractualist economy; by the end, at least thirty-five states were contractualist.82 The Westphalian system has never been as conducive to transitions to contractualist economies as it has been under the contractualist hegemony, which prohibits states from starting wars for booty, debt collection, or territory. Nor has the world ever had such widespread access to capital, mobility, and equity in trade as it has had since the contractualist hegemony made it so with the signing of the Atlantic Charter and the implementation of the Bretton Woods agreements. The number of transitions also predictably increased after the Cold War, when the contractualist hegemony emerged as largely unchallenged. In this way, system change toward contractualist hegemony within the anarchic order, rooted in unit-level change, ultimately promotes more unit-level change toward a contractualist world.

Reports of the Demise of the Liberal Order Are Greatly Exaggerated

I have argued that the liberal global order is on the rise; yet, liberal values around the world seem to be in retreat. In recent years, two contractualist states with populist governments—Hungary and Poland—have begun to embrace anti-immigrant and anti-globalization positions. In the United States, President Donald Trump appears to favor status values such as power, rank, and loyalty over contractualist values such as equity and respect for the rule of law. In foreign policy, Trump does not seem to share contractualists' opposition to Russia's efforts to sow chaos, and he sees trade in terms of winners and losers.

Reports of the demise of the liberal order, however, are greatly exaggerated. First, Hungary and Poland are newly contractualist states. The sociological nature of economic norms theory means that contractualist values should be more firmly rooted in older contractualist societies than in newer ones. This is corroborated with the natural experiment of Germany: in 1962 West Germany embraced contractualism (see table 1), but it was only after 1991 that East Germany could have become contractualist, when massive investments from the Federal Republic caused incomes in the marketplace to become higher than incomes obtainable from status relationships. Today, Germany's populist movement is concentrated in the eastern part of the country and is largely nonexistent in the western part,83 which corroborates the expectation that some newly contractualist societies retain some of their status values even after a generation of robust opportunity in the marketplace. Deeper changes in values may not occur until generational cohorts initially socialized into status or axial economies have passed on.

Second, the electorates in most of the thirty-five contractualist states listed in table 1 in 2010 have not experienced substantial increases in populist sentiment. Italy's Five Star movement is often called populist but largely because of its anti-immigrant stance. Although an embrace of immigrants would seem consistent with contractualist values, opposition to large numbers of immigrants is arguably a rational response to what is essentially a huge external shock that has intensified in recent years. Britons voted to leave the European Union, but largely because they believed they were being treated unfairly in it. The rejection of unfair terms of trade, whether perceived correctly or not, is consistent with contractualist values.

Third, the strength of institutions far exceeds that of any one person, including the president of the United States. Liberal values and institutions are rooted in contractualist economic norms and will not disappear simply because some leaders choose not to abide by them. For instance, although Trump may want the United States to withdraw from the North Atlantic alliance, this is not a view shared by Congress and the American people. Even members of Trump's administration have often restrained him in ways consistent with contractualist values and institutions.84

In economic norms theory, the only way the United States' contractualist values could shift to status or axial values would be through radical economic change. As mentioned above, economics is ultimately at the mercy of politics, as an influential coalition of rent-seekers could potentially collapse a contractualist economy by failing to sustain the highly inclusive marketplace or uphold the state's credibility in enforcing of contracts. In recent years, the U.S. economy has begun tilting toward rent-seekers, given the growing role of private money in electoral campaigns and the increasing sophistication of rent-seekers in masking their activities though the manipulation of public opinion, including through their concentrated ownership of media outlets. Such rentierism could precipitate a change in U.S. values if it results in a retraction of the market substantial enough that newer generations began to obtain higher wages in newfound status networks than in the marketplace.

In this way, the Trump phenomenon may reflect a pathology in U.S. governing institutions; but at least so far, it arguably has not extended to the American people. Most of Trump's supporters seem to be drawn to him not for his expressions of status values, but for his pledges to fight a “rigged” system and create well-paying jobs. Whether or not Trump means what he says, many of his supporters saw a vote for him as an act of protest against the increasing corruption occurring in the United States, a clear contractualist expression.85 Although a collapse of the U.S. economy and transition to an axial or a status economy is always possible, the feedback loop of popular insistence on economic growth and a highly inclusive marketplace makes this unlikely. Aside from an external shock (such as nuclear war or climate devastation), such a transition could happen only if the rentiers somehow manage to remain in power long enough to institutionalize a permanently underemployed underclass.

Fourth, even if the U.S. economy were to collapse and the United States became an axial or a status power, the combined economic might of all the other contractualist countries in the world is nearly twice that of the United States. The soft power of the United States in world politics lies not in its power to persuade, but in it being the largest of the contractualist states, and in its willingness to provide the public good of global security since the collapse of the pound sterling in late 1946. If the United States withdrew from its leadership role, the remaining contractualist powers would fill the vacuum. None of them has an economy relatively large enough to enable it to act as a natural leader and principal provider of global security, but it is the temperament of these states that they can easily form an international organization to coordinate and act on their shared security interests, even if some may choose to free ride.

Fifth, current events need to be viewed within a larger context. Fernand Braudel pinpoints the rise of the modern world economy as starting around the year 1450 in northwestern Europe.86 The first contractualist economy emerged more than two centuries ago. Since then, contractualist states have confronted numerous shocks and threats to their systems, including the American Civil War, the Great Depression, two world wars, and the Cold War. The present populist mini-wave and pathologies in U.S. democracy are mere trifling episodes in a larger historical frame.

Conclusion

This article has introduced a new liberal theory of global politics and argues that global alignments are rooted in factors internal to states: status states want expansion and disorder wherever they lack control; contractualist states want universal stability and order based on the principle of self-determination for all states. As such, global patterns of war, peace, and cooperation can be explained without recourse to such external factors as trade interdependence, international institutions, interstate images, or intersubjective structure; economic norms theory can explain these patterns from states' internal conditions alone. If this argument is correct, then the relative power of states does determine the perception of threat, as realists have long maintained, but with an essential qualifi- cation: only among status states. In this way, internal conditions can explain why 2,400 years ago Sparta feared the rising power of Athens, and why today the distribution of power seems to be playing an ever reduced role in global politics.

My analyses of most states from 1946 to 2010 corroborate the prediction of a liberal global hierarchy managed by a natural alliance of states with contractualist economies. States with contractualist and export-oriented economies tend to agree on issues voted on in the United Nations General Assembly, regardless of their power status or capability, because they have common interests in a global order based on self-determination. Among states with status and insular economies, in contrast, major powers and those with greater capability are more likely to balance the contractualist hegemony, which they fear. Meanwhile, minor powers and those with less capability are more likely to bandwagon with it, which they fear less than they do the status major powers.

Additionally, the theory provides an explanation for a large number of observed facts in international politics. It can explain the decline of war. It can explain the United States' enduring soft power, and why its leadership continues utterly unchallenged by other market powers, despite its relative economic decline since the mid-twentieth century. It offers an account for why developing states with weak institutions tend to bandwagon with the Western powers;87 and why land powers tend to provoke counterbalancing coalitions, and sea powers, which tend to be trading powers, do not.88 It can account for the democratic peace; why democracies tend to win their wars; and why the probability of war among market democracies is practically zero. It can explain how states become prosperous; how democracy consolidates; the tenacity of corruption in developing countries; why Western powers reproach their clients for their corruption;89 and why states fail. It can explain global terrorism and anti-Americanism.90

If the theory is right, war is becoming obsolete, and not for reasons supposed in most international relations theorizing. There is no security dilemma in international politics, as realists contend there is: relative power reliably matters only to leaders of status states, which always consider all other states enemies. Yet, the trajectory of peace is not at all caused by democracy, trade, or international institutions, as liberals maintain. As argued here, democracy, trade, and institutions are epiphenomenal. Contractualist economies are not the only explanation for these factors, but they are a cause of democratic consolidation, foreign policy preferences for equitable trade, and international organization. Leaders of contractualist states assess threats based not on their images of other states' regime types, economic types, or their capabilities, but on their behavior.

What economic norms theory cannot explain is the triggering environmental and political origins of economic change. Although the theory predicts systemic effects (contractualist hegemony) on unit-level change (national transitions toward contractualist economies), it cannot predict when and where leaders of status and axial states might seek to support the market; when and where contractualist economies will emerge; or when and where systemic effects will result in changes in the units. The theory treats economic change largely exogenously.91

Thus, the theory cannot predict what China will do in the future, because it is impossible to know whether it will become a contractualist power. The theory can predict, however, that conflict with China is not inevitable, and that it can be avoided if the contractualist powers do not confuse China's mercantilist pursuits with incipient revisionism, and if they grasp that China's leadership increasingly has interests in the global market order. If China transitions to a contractualist economy—and such a prospect is likely if current trends continue—the proportion of people in the contractualist mind-set worldwide will more than double, from 16 percent to 35 percent. This would greatly increase the speed of the trajectory toward peace, as long as the planet can ecologically sustain the contractualist economies' high levels of productivity.

Russia, in contrast, is the natural enemy of the contractualist hegemony: its status economy encourages the sowing of chaos anywhere Russia lacks control, putting it in direct opposition to the contractualists' interest in order. Russia has a substantial nuclear arsenal, but this does not diminish the overwhelming might of the contractualist hegemony, because nuclear weapons can be used rationally only to deter attacks. Contractualist states do not attack states to make them contractualist, so Russia's deterrent capability has no effect on the power of this hegemony and the trajectory of peace.

Since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, an alliance of contractualist states has sought to impose a global order based on the principle of self-determination—a principle that applies to all states, large and small. This global order is increasing the odds of states transitioning from status to contractualist economies and reducing the odds of reverse transitions. In this way, economic norms theory supports the proposition that the world may be nearing half a millennium of change that began with the rise of axial markets in northwestern Europe around 1450. If the theory is correct, the beginning of the end of this change may have been the emergence of the contractualist hegemony in the mid-twentieth century. This article has argued that no status power could ever overtake the combined might of this hegemony. Thus, barring some dark force that brings about a collapse of the global economy, the world is now in the endgame of a five-century-long trajectory toward permanent peace and prosperity.

**It solves global poverty and structural violence---prefer long-run, macro-level trends over short term disruptions---reject their Trumpian moralizing**

**Bowman 17** [Sam, September 2017, Executive Director of the Adam Smith Institute (British think tank) in London, “IN DEFENCE OF NEOLIBERALISM,” <https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2017/09/33-3-bowman-sam.pdf>]

To free marketeers, there is little question that this change is worth it. Automation and technological progress **may disrupt people’s lives** but ultimately we think of new things for people to do and the extra wealth and tools that technological advances create raise everybody’s living standards in the long run. Trade, **usually blamed** for hurting ordinary workers while helping the rich, is actually especially good for the poor. A 2014 study in the United States estimated the gains from trade to different parts of American society based on baskets of goods designed to represent **different consumption patterns along the income distribution,** and then calculated how much poorer the bottom 10% would be without global trade, compared with the top 10%.5 The gains from trade accruing from cheaper goods were not felt equally between rich and poor: the real income loss from closing off trade is 63% at the bottom 10% of the income distribution and 28% for the top 10%. Globally, extreme poverty has fallen **from 44%** of the world’s population in 1981 **to 9.6% today**.6 Openness to trade, better property rights and the de-nationalisation of state-run industries in China have between them driven at least two-thirds of that country’s growth since 1980, **lifting millions** of people out of poverty. Under communism, Chinese GDP per capita was $300 a year. Today it’s **$10,000 a year and rising.** Migration, generally a mild net positive for natives, can make the migrants themselves far richer. World Bank officials have argued that there is ‘simply no contest’ between guest worker programs and other anti-poverty programs like cash transfers or microfinance—participants in New Zealand’s seasonal worker program experience huge increases in income, greater subjective well-being, and more schooling for their kids.7 But the shocks are real enough and the trend is not particularly encouraging. David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson recently evaluated the ‘China shock’ of greater Chinese imports to the US between 1990 and 2007.8 They found that in areas with existing manufacturing that were competing with Chinese imports, rising imports raised local unemployment, cut wages, and drove more people out of the labour force altogether, whether onto disability benefits or into early retirement. Other studies have looked at the declining labour share of GDP—a trend observable in most OECD countries since the early 1990s, ending a previously stable ‘stylized fact’ of the ratio between returns to capital and labour.9 The reason seems to be entirely driven by the rise of so-called ‘superstar firms’ like Google, Facebook and Amazon in new kinds of markets where very low marginal costs mean there is no inherent ceiling on firm size. Software often does not have the same diseconomies of scale that normal products do, so one firm would be expected to dominate each market at a time. These ‘winner takes all’ markets are not inherently monopolistic, because these large firms are still vulnerable to rivals with better products, but whoever has the best product on offer at a given time is likely to have a very large amount of market share. Low marginal costs and high fixed costs (of innovating better products) have, so far, meant that only a small number of extremely talented workers are necessary for success. The result has been something of a divergence between economic growth and wage growth which may continue. Trying to reverse or undo these trends would be counterproductive, yet this is often the usual political answer. Regulation to try to brute-force firms into paying workers more usually backfires, and protectionism is not the answer to disruption caused by trade. As Paul Krugman writes: The lesson I took from the widely cited Autor, Dorn, and Hanson paper on the China shock was that Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin were less relevant to the political economy of trade than the sheer pace of change, which disrupted local manufacturing concentrations and the communities they supported. The point is that a protectionist turn, reversing the trade growth that has already happened, would be the same kind of shock given where we are now. It’s like the old joke about the motorist who runs over a pedestrian, then tries to undo the damage by backing up— and runs over the victim a second time.10 The neoliberal agenda There is no new ‘neoliberal moment’, though it is convenient to suggest that France’s Emmanuel Macron represents one. But for a group of us the term is a useful differentiation from fellow travellers (see the box overleaf on how to spot a neoliberal). We are globalist consequentialists who have concluded that free markets, property rights, free trade and liberal migration policies are effective tools for **fostering** economic growth and improving the well-being **of the global poor**. We’re suspicious of politics; democracy is not the panacea for our problems that many on the left and, increasingly, the populist right seem to think. We **cannot** hope to **solve political problems** by **chucking out experts** and replacing them with politicians or referendums. We are comfortable with redistribution of income, done simply through cash transfers instead of a complicated welfare state. In a sentence, a neoliberal’s worldview might be something like this: Governments should facilitate **as much wealth creation as possible**, and redistribute some of it after. This differs from left-liberal Blairism in its scepticism about the effectiveness of government as a piecemeal problem-solver and its prima facie preference for markets in most cases where scarce resources must be allocated. It differs from libertarianism and classical liberalism in its support for a fairly large degree of income redistribution, though done differently to how most developed nations do this at present. Neoliberals are alarmed at the right’s **embrace of nationalism** and the populist idea that economics and good policy doesn’t matter, that ‘experts’ are systematically biased and should be ignored. At the same time, the lurch towards the hard left in the form of people like Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, Beppe Grillo and Jean-Luc Melenchon suggests that the old ideological battles that many thought had been settled must be fought once again. The ‘neoliberal agenda’, then, is to resist both zombie Marxism and right-wing populism in the areas where these are making the biggest gains. Trade, in particular, is vulnerable. Defending and **extending the global liberal order** means, above all, resisting moves away from **trade openness** favoured by the Trump administration and some ‘hard’ Brexiteers who have toyed with the idea of tariffs and subsidies to protect British jobs from better foreign competition. **Seen costs dominate unseen benefits**. The negative consequences of trade openness and automation—the ‘destruction’ of some old jobs and the low status of many of the new ones—seem to be much more salient to people than the benefits. A cheaper iPhone is seen as a frivolity compared to a rewarding, high status job in manufacturing, and the other benefits of trade and automation are nearly invisible. Welfare and labour market reforms may at least mitigate some of the harms here. Replacing complicated welfare systems (in Britain there are over 50 different kinds of benefit payments available) with simple cash payments, whether in the form of a Negative Income Tax, a workcontingent payment (similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit) or wage subsidies to employers may make uneconomic jobs that give workers a greater sense of self-worth (such as some of those involving manual labour or manufacturing) more viable. Combined with labour market deregulation, greater innovation about how to use workers may stop or reverse the shift of income away from workers’ wages. Ultimately, a lack of economic growth across much of the developed world seems like the biggest cause of our present woes. People will put up with a lot if they feel like their family’s lives are getting better. ‘Going for growth’ involves a focus on the lowesthanging policy fruit. For example, in most Englishspeaking countries, urban zoning and planning laws have created housing crises in prosperous cities. Living in Sydney, London or San Francisco is astonishingly expensive now by historical or international standards. Apart from the first-order effects this has of raising people’s cost of living, the second-order effect is probably a significant drag on growth. By preventing people from moving to where they could be most productive, expensive housing holds economic growth back. This ‘spatial misallocation’ is estimated by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti to have lowered aggregate US growth by more than 50% between 1964 and 2009.11 The same is likely true in other Englishspeaking countries. (Continental Europe has different problems.) Another example is tax, where the structure of corporation tax is such that investment is usually taxed heavily. This need not be the case: full capital expensing would effectively shift the burden of corporation tax away from investment towards consumption and be far less of a drag on growth. This would also probably allow the creation of more manufacturing jobs in developed countries, since it is machinery and property investment that are typically hit hardest by corporation tax. (In the UK, former Chancellor George Osborne funded his headline corporation tax cuts by increasing the relative tax burden on machinery and property investment.) Neoliberals will always be a small group. But the idea of neoliberalism has captured some people’s imaginations and seems to be filling an **open niche in the political market**. Online especially, many younger people who are uncomfortable with libertarianism’s dogmatic image and enjoy the naughtiness of re-appropriating a political swear word have adopted the label.

#### Spreading capitalism creates global prosperity and environmental sustainability. Abandoning it is disastrous.

Rhonheimer, 20—teaching professor at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross (Martin, “Capitalism is Good for the Poor – and for the Environment,” <https://austrian-institute.org/en/subjects-en/catholic-social-doctrine-2/capitalism-is-good-for-the-poor-and-for-the-environment/>, dml)

It is not social policy but capitalism that has created today’s prosperity.

What is important is that what made today’s mass prosperity possible – a phenomenon unprecedented in history – was not social policy or social legislation, organised trade union pressure, or corrective interventions in the capitalist economy, but rather market capitalism itself, due to its enormous potential for innovation and the ever-increasing productivity of human labour that resulted from it.

Increasing prosperity and quality of life are always the result of increasing labour productivity. Only increased productivity enabled higher social standards, better working conditions, the overcoming of child labour, a higher level of education, and the emergence of human capital. This process of increasing triumph over poverty and the constantly rising living standards of the general masses is taking place on a global scale – but only where the market economy and capitalist entrepreneurship are able to spread.

From industrial overexploitation of nature to ecological awareness

The first phase of industrialisation and capitalism was characterised by an enormous consumption of resources and frequent overexploitation of nature, which soon gave the impression that this process could not be sustainable. Since the end of the 19th century, disaster and doom scenarios have repeatedly been put forward, but in retrospect they have proved to be wrong: The combination of technological innovation, market competition, and entrepreneurial profit-seeking (with the compulsion to constantly minimise costs) have meant that these scenarios never occurred. The ever-increasing population has been increasingly better supplied thanks to innovative technologies, ever-increasing output with lower consumption of resources less harmful to the environment – e.g. less arable land in agriculture, or oil and electricity instead of coal for rapidly increasing mobility. More recent disaster scenarios, such as those spread by reputable scientists since the late 1960s and in the 1970s, have also proved to be inaccurate.

The reason things developed differently was the always underestimated innovative dynamism of the capitalist market economy, a growing ecological awareness and, as a result, legislative intervention that took advantage of the logic of market capitalism: As a result of the ecological movement that had come out of the United States since 1970, wise legislation began to use the price mechanism to apply market incentives to internalize negative externalities. Environmental pollution was given a price-tag.

This led to an enormous decrease in air pollution and other ecological consequences of growth, which is only possible in free, market-based societies, because the production process here is characterized by competition and constant pressure to reduce costs, i.e. to the most profitable use of resources. On the other hand, all forms of socialism, i.e. a state-controlled economy, have proved to be ecological disasters and have left behind destruction of gigantic proportions, without providing the population with anything that is near comparable in prosperity, often even by destroying existing prosperity, such as happened in Venezuela.

Capitalist profit motive combined with digitalization as a solution: Increasing decoupling of growth and resource consumption

Moreover, technological innovations combined with capitalist profit-seeking and market competition have led to a new and surprising phenomenon over the past decades, which is still hardly noticed in the public debate: the decoupling of growth and resource consumption (“dematerialization”). In a wide variety of industrial sectors, the developed countries, above all the U.S., are now achieving ever greater productive output with increasingly fewer resources. This has a lot to do with technology, especially the digitalization of the economy and of our entire lives.

As the well-known MIT professor Andrew McAfee shows in his book More from Less, published in October 2019, this process also follows the logic of capitalist profit maximization. To get it going, we do not need politics, even though wise, properly incentivizing legislation can be helpful and sometimes necessary. Above all, however, it is the combination of technological innovation, capitalist profit-seeking, and market-based entrepreneurial competition that will also solve the problem of man-made global warming.

In addition, property rights and their protection are decisive for the careful use of natural resources. And where this is not possible, legal support for collective self-governing structures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, are important—as is analysed by Nobel Economic Prize winner Elinor Ostrom. By contrast, the growing ideologically motivated anti-capitalist eco-activism, and the policies influenced by it, are leading in the wrong direction, distracting precisely from what would be best for the climate and the environment—and distracting us from what could help protect us against the inevitable consequences of global warming.

#### Attempts to transition away from capitalism fail without meaningful blueprint and ensure horrific violence

Condit 15 [Celeste, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Feb 4, 2015, Quarterly Journal of Speech, Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015]

The theories of social change that dominated American Communication Studies at the close of the twentieth century echoed those of the Western humanities. These theories spurred extensive thought about the performances of individual identity and the relationship of identity to mass media and culture, and they probably had some laudable influence on the broader culture. They are, however, inadequate to the evolving contexts I have described. One can sum up the most widely circulating theories of social change among “critical social theorists” of the twentieth century in the following, admittedly simplified, statement: There is an (evil) Totality (fill in the blank with one or more: patriarchy, whites, the West, the U.S., neo-liberalism, global capitalism) that must be overturned by a Radical Revolution. We don't know the shape of what will come after the Revolution, but The Evil is a construction of the Totality, so anything that comes after will be better. All you need is … (fill in the blank: Love, Courage, Violence, etc.). For an example, read Slavoj Žižek's attack on the evil Totality (“capitalism,”5 pp. 41/49), which requires the “excess” of violence named as “courage”6 (pp. 75, 78, 79), via “a leap”7 (p. 81), to eliminate “democracy” for a yet-to-be-imagined “new collectivity” (p. 85).8 The resilience of this social theory identifies it as a rhetorical attractor; a predispositional symbolic set that readily transmits emotive potency. To appropriate Kenneth Burke's terms, the bio-symbolics of human political relationships readily create a “grammar” and “rhetoric” in the form of a unified enemy that can be imagined as defeated in a singular battle, after which, things in “our” tribe may be harmonious. To identify this fantasy theme in this way is to suggest that it may not merely be the product of “Western” or “capitalist” imaginations, but rather that it arises from an intersection of the structural characteristics of language systems and the nature of human biologies (which readily adopt both tribal social cooperation and inter-tribal competition). Because neither biology nor symbolics are deterministic systems, this fantasy theme is avoidable, even if it is powerfully attractive. Because both biology and symbolics are material, however, specific kinds of work are necessary in order to avoid the lure of that predisposition. This point is crucial, because it invalidates the twentieth century (idealist) approaches to social change, which envisioned a single (violent) leap away from the social as sufficient to create and maintain better worlds. Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor

to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

# 2NC

**Key to tech---that solves the environment and proves it’s sustainable**

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* Transition to service sector
* More resources for R+D
* Income level increases---demands on policymakers

Some seminal papers reveal that, within the process of economic growth, environmental pollution level first scales up and later scales down. This is an inverted U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and pollution level (Grossman and Krueger [3,4], Panayotou [5], Shafik [6], Selden and Song [7]). Since this relationship resembles the relationship between GDP per capita and income inequality produced by Kuznets [8], Panayotou [5] calls it Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). According to the EKC hypothesis, the level of environmental pollution initially intensifies because of economic growth, later tampers after GDP per capita reaches a threshold value (Panayotou [5], Suri and Chapman [9]; Stern [10]). Therefore, this hypothesis implies a dynamic process in which structural change occurs together with economic growth (Dinda [2]). Grossman and Krueger [3] first clarify how the EKC arises. They explore that economic growth affects environmental quality through three channels: (i) scale effect, (ii) structural effect, and (iii) technological effect. Fig. 1 presents the EKC within the periods of (i), (ii) and (iii). According to the scale effect, given the level of technology, more resources and inputs are employed to produce more commodities at the beginning of economic growth path. Hence, more energy resources and production will induce more waste and pollutant emissions, and the level of environmental quality will get worse (Torras and Boyce [11], Dinda [2], Prieur [12]). The structural effect states that the economy will have a structural transformation, and economic growth will affect environment positively along with continuation of growth. In other words, as national production grows the structure of economy changes, and the share of less polluting economic activities increases gradually. Besides, an economy experiences a transition from capital-intensive industrial sectors to service sector and reaches technology-intensive knowledge economy (the final stage of the structural change). Due to the fact that technology-intensive sectors utilize fewer natural sources, the impact of these sectors on environmental pollution will be less. The last channel of the growth process is the technological effect channel. Since a high-income economy can allocate more resources for research and development expenditures, the new technological processes will emerge. Thus, the country will replace old and dirty technologies with new and clean technologies, and environmental quality will deepen (Borghesi [13], Copelan and Taylor [14]). Consequently, environmental pollution initially increases and later decreases as a result of scale, structural and technological effect emerging along with growth path. Some studies of EKC hypothesis consider income elasticity of clean environment demand (Beckerman [15], Selden and Song [16], McConnel [17], Panayotou [18], Carson et al. [19], Brock and Taylor [20]). Accordingly, the share of low-income people’s expenditures for food and basic necessities is higher than that of high-income societies’ expenditures for the same type of commodities (Engel’s Law). As income level and life standards rise in conjunction with economic growth, the societies’ demand for clean environment advances. Besides, societies make often pressure on policy makers to protect the environment through new regulations. One might argue that, because of these reasons, clean environment is a luxury commodity and the demand elasticity of clean environment is higher than unity (Dinda [2]).

#### Decolonizing the academy from within debate is impossible without taking responsibility for debate’s dialogical form. Simply theorizing indigenous perspectives is not enough—contextualizing those perspectives to particular demands, defending their consequences, and submitting them to oppositional testing are all prerequisites to decolonial praxis.

Kuokkanen, 10—Assistant Professor in Political Science and Aboriginal Studies at the University of Toronto, Sámi (Rauna, “The Responsibility of the Academy: A Call for Doing Homework,” Journal of Curriculum Theory Vol. 26, Iss. 3, (2010): 61-74, dml)

It is important to note that when we talk about indigenous peoples' relationship with their lands, it is not a question of whether an individual may or may not have a relationship with her or his environment. Obviously, it is important to distinguish between a philosophy or a worldview and individual thinking and behaviour which may not always reflect or comply with the former. Moreover, my intention here is not to evoke the stereotype of 'ecological Indian' or any other variety of the Noble Savage, but to consider how certain aspects of indigenous life philosophies can inform our rethinking the notion of responsibility and how that could be applied in endeavours aimed at decolonizing and transforming the hegemonic academy characterized by sanctioned epistemic ignorance. In the context of rapid corporatization of the academy, there is a pressing need to envision alternatives that oppose the destructive agendas affecting all of us. The pervasive nature of neoliberal corporate mentality is also reflected in the (willy-nilly) adoption of its values such as the externalization of social responsibility by many academics. It seems that the ethos and values of corporations and consumer culture are increasingly influencing the academy. In the former, social responsibility is considered a distortion of business principles (Bakan, 2004, p. 35), whereas in the latter, "we are actively prevented from exercising care and living in ecologically-embedded and responsible ways" (Plumwood, 2002, p. 16). As a result, we have academics, including many 'revolutionary scholars,' who prefer to point fingers rather than start examining their own roles in espousing new forms of social responsibility. As Grande (2004) contends:

In this context, the voices of indigenous and other non-Western peoples become increasingly vital, not because such peoples categorically possess any kind of magical, mystical power to fix countless generations of abuse and neglect, but because non-Western peoples and nations exist as living critiques of the dominant culture, providing critique-al knowledge and potentially transformative paradigms. (p. 65)

What is more, elaborating a different logic-that of the gift-in and for contemporary contexts is different from the trend of evoking (often undefined) 'traditions' and formulating action plans grounded on cultural authenticity, nationalism or separatism. An uncritical reinscription of tradition is problematic for many reasons but particularly because of the real dangers of further excluding already marginalized groups such as indigenous women (Green, 2004; LaRocque, 1997).

However, the reality is that contemporary indigenous peoples generally continue to be culturally, socially, economically and spiritually more directly dependent on their lands and surrounding natural environments. This thinking is still a central part of indigenous philosophies while for many other peoples, this previously existing connection and relationship with the physical surroundings started to erode generations ago as a result of modernization, colonization and other developments since the Renaissance and Enlightenment which continue today in the form of neocolonialism and patriarchal global capitalism.

In cultures and societies that foreground reciprocity, individuals are brought up with an understanding and expectation of acting for others. In other words, the notion of responsibility is an integral part of being human and an inseparable part of one's identity. Armstrong (1996), an Okanagan writer and educator, articulates her identity and thus, her responsibilities, as follows:

I know the mountains, and by birth, the river is my responsibility: They are part of me. I cannot be separated from my place or my land. When I introduce myself to my own people in my own language, I describe these things because it tells them what my responsibilities are and what my goal is. (p. 461)

By recognizing her responsibilities, Armstrong knows her location and her role in her community; in short, she knows who she is. This notion of responsibility stems from a perception of interrelatedness of all life forms-that it is her responsibility to ensure the well-being of the mountains and river because it is directly related to her personal as well as to her community's well-being. Nuu-chah-nulth hereditary whaling chief and the founding Chair of the World Council of Whalers, Happynook (2000), elaborates this understanding as follows:

When we talk about indigenous cultural practices we are in fact talking about responsibilities that have evolved into unwritten tribal laws over millennia. These responsibilities and laws are directly tied to nature and are a product of the slow integration of cultures within their environment and the ecosystems. Thus, the environment is not a place of divisions but rather a place of relations, a place where cultural diversity and bio-diversity are not separate but in fact need each other. (n.p.)4 In western philosophical tradition, responsibility is considered a complex concept discussed and theorized by numerous scholars. Gasché (1995), for example, argues that "[t]here is perhaps no theme more demanding than that of 'responsibility'" (p. 227). A normative definition in this tradition views responsibility "as a mechanical application of a framework of rules that simultaneously relieves the subject of the onus of decision and, hence, of all liability" (Gasché, 1995, p. 227). On the other hand, however, responsibility implies a responsible response which can take place "only if the decision is truly a decision, not a mechanical reaction to, or an effect of, a determinate cause" (Gasché, 1995, p. 227). Gasché (1995) further notes that considering responsibility involves a number of risks and thus, "[a] responsible discourse on responsibility can indeed only assert itself in the mode of a 'perhaps'" (p. 228). For Heidegger, responsibility is "a response to which one commits oneself" (as cited in Gasché, 1995, p. 228). This idea of responsiveness or respondence is further explicated by Spivak whose notion of responsibility reflects Bakhtin's articulation of 'answerability.'6 Spivak (1994) proposes that response: involves not only 'respond to,' as in 'give an answer to,' but also the related situations of 'answering to,' as in being responsible for a name (this brings up the question of the relationship between being responsible for/to ourselves and for/to others); of being answerable...( p. 22)

Responsibility signifies the act of response which completes the transaction of speaker and listener, as well as the ethical stance of making discursive space for the 'other' to exist. For Spivak, "ethics are not just a problem of knowledge but a call to a relationship" (Spivak, Landry, & Maclean, 1996, p. 5). If responsibility cannot be merely mechanical expectation to answer, what does it mean, then, to call for a willingness to give a response and for ability to response (i.e., response-ability)?

Responsibility necessitates knowledge. It requires knowing how to respond but also act in a responsible manner. Derrida (1992) suggests that "not knowing, having neither a sufficient knowledge or consciousness of what being responsible means, is of itself a lack of responsibility" (p. 25). If knowledge is a prerequisite for responsibility, ignorance presents a serious threat to responsible, response-able behaviour and thinking. Moreover, responsibility demands action:

If it is true that the concept of responsibility has, in the most reliable continuity of its history, always implied involvement in action, doing, a praxis, a decision that exceeds simple conscience or simple theoretical understanding, it is also true that the same concept requires a decision or responsible action to answer for itself consciously, that is, with knowledge of a thematics of what is done, of what action signifies, its causes, ends, etc. (Derrida, 1992, p. 25)

Responsibility as action beyond theorizing poses a possibility of an interruption: "there is no responsibility without a dissident and inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodoxy, rule, or doctrine" (Derrida, 1992, p. 27). Responsibility as a rupture of tradition may sound at odds with indigenous perceptions and practices of responsibility which emphasize the continuance of tradition. However, no tradition is static, remaining unchanged throughout history, as indigenous people also repeatedly stress, particularly when confronted by irresponsible demands for authenticity. There has always been a rupture, both inventive (usually from within) and intrusive, and interventionist (usually from without).6 In the context of the academy, responsibility with an inventive rupture implies, first and foremost, the ability of interrupting the self, of moving beyond the 'I' as the ethical subject (Derrida, 1997, p. 52).

Although the academy is prone to list its responsibilities in its lofty vision statements and to call for the responsibilities of students and researchers, we frequently witness the unwillingness of the institution itself to respond, to be answerable and take action. Instead of opening up toward the other, the representatives who feel implicated become defensive or remain silent. As Derrida notes in the above quote, responsibility links consciousness with conscience. It is inadequate to merely know one's responsibilities; one also has to be conscious of the consequences of one's actions. Without conscience, there is a risk of the arrogance of a 'clean conscience.'

Derrida further calls for "new ways of taking responsibility" in the academy which are critical of the professionalization of the university (Derrida, 1983). These new ways would signify rethinking the university institution, examining its disciplinary structures and in particular, "a new way of educating students that will prepare them to undertake new analyses" (Derrida, 1983, p. 16). Moreover, Derrida (1983) notes:

New responsibilities cannot be purely academic. If they remain extremely difficult to assume, extremely precarious and threatened, it is because they must at once keep alive the memory of a tradition and make an opening beyond any program, that is, toward what is called the future. ( p. 16)

New ways of taking responsibility in the academy are linked to the question: What constitutes a 'good' university? If the new responsibilities cannot be purely academic, the answers cannot always be found there either. One has to make an opening beyond the academy. I suggest considering the Okanagan concept of En'owkin that signifies a process of group commitment to find the most appropriate solutions through a respectful dialogue. En'owkin is a collective process that seeks to find ways to include those voices that are in a minority. En'owkin recognizes that these voices are most needed and that understanding these voices is critical for meaningful, good governance. Practiced in community and extended family circles, the idea of En'owkin is not to make decisions but to hear all the voices. The premise of En'owkin is that nobody alone can have the answers and that if somebody is arguing for his or her point, there is no need to listen. The most important aspect is not to stage an argument but to ensure that every perspective is being heard. In other words, En'owkin implies that one is not participating in the process in order to debate or enforce one's own agenda but to try to understand the most oppositional thinking to one's own and recognize its importance so that the difference becomes diversity. If these aspects of listening and dialoguing are not taken into account and followed, there are no rational outcomes and as a result, people are taking serious risks for the next generations (Armstrong,1996).7 As with the logic of the gift and gift giving practices, it is not difficult to see how the principles of En'owkin could be practiced in the academy in the name of a 'good' university that is ready to take its responsibilities in a new way, beyond the academy.

#### The aff asks us to defer to indigenous ideas of the land—that shirks political responsibility which is worse for movement building

Táíwò, 20—assistant professor of philosophy at Georgetown University (Olúfémi, “Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,” The Philosopher, vol. 108, no. 4, dml)

I think it’s less about the core ideas and more about the prevailing norms that convert them into practice. The call to “listen to the most affected” or “centre the most marginalized” is ubiquitous in many academic and activist circles. But it’s never sat well with me. In my experience, when people say they need to “listen to the most affected”, it isn’t because they intend to set up Skype calls to refugee camps or to collaborate with houseless people. Instead, it has more often meant handing conversational authority and attentional goods to those who most snugly fit into the social categories associated with these ills – regardless of what they actually do or do not know, or what they have or have not personally experienced. In the case of my conversation with Helen, my racial category tied me more “authentically” to an experience that neither of us had had. She was called to defer to me by the rules of the game as we understood it. Even where stakes are high – where potential researchers are discussing how to understand a social phenomenon, where activists are deciding what to target – these rules often prevail.

The trap wasn’t that standpoint epistemology was affecting the conversation, but how. Broadly, the norms of putting standpoint epistemology into practice call for practices of deference: giving offerings, passing the mic, believing. These are good ideas in many cases, and the norms that ask us to be ready to do them stem from admirable motivations: a desire to increase the social power of marginalized people identified as sources of knowledge and rightful targets of deferential behaviour. But deferring in this way as a rule or default political orientation can actually work counter to marginalized groups’ interests, especially in elite spaces.

Some rooms have outsize power and influence: the Situation Room, the newsroom, the bargaining table, the conference room. Being in these rooms means being in a position to affect institutions and broader social dynamics by way of deciding what one is to say and do. Access to these rooms is itself a kind of social advantage, and one often gained through some prior social advantage. From a societal standpoint, the “most affected” by the social injustices we associate with politically important identities like gender, class, race, and nationality are disproportionately likely to be incarcerated, underemployed, or part of the 44 percent of the world’s population without internet access – and thus both left out of the rooms of power and largely ignored by the people in the rooms of power. Individuals who make it past the various social selection pressures that filter out those social identities associated with these negative outcomes are most likely to be in the room. That is, they are most likely to be in the room precisely because of ways in which they are systematically different from (and thus potentially unrepresentative of) the very people they are then asked to represent in the room.

I suspected that Helen’s offer was a trap. She was not the one who set it, but it threatened to ensnare us both all the same. Broader cultural norms – the sort set in motion by prefacing statements with “As a Black man…” – cued up a set of standpoint-respecting practices that many of us know consciously or unconsciously by rote. However, the forms of deference that often follow are ultimately self-undermining and only reliably serve “elite capture”: the control over political agendas and resources by a group’s most advantaged people. If we want to use standpoint epistemology to challenge unjust power arrangements, it’s hard to imagine how we could do worse.

To say what’s wrong with the popular, deferential applications of standpoint epistemology, we need to understand what makes it popular. A number of cynical answers present themselves: some (especially the more socially advantaged) don’t genuinely want social change – they just want the appearance of it. Alternatively, deference to figures from oppressed communities is a performance that sanitizes, apologizes for, or simply distracts from the fact that the deferrer has enough “in the room” privilege for their “lifting up” of a perspective to be of consequence.

I suspect there is some truth to these views, but I am unsatisfied. Many of the people who support and enact these deferential norms are rather like Helen: motivated by the right reasons, but trusting people they share such rooms with to help them find the proper practical expression of their joint moral commitments. We don’t need to attribute bad faith to all or even most of those who interpret standpoint epistemology deferentially to explain the phenomenon, and it’s not even clear it would help. Bad “roommates” aren’t the problem for the same reason that Helen being a good roommate wasn’t the solution: the problem emerges from how the rooms themselves are constructed and managed.

To return to the initial example with Helen, the issue wasn’t merely that I hadn’t grown up in the kind of low-income, redlined community she was imagining. The epistemic situation was much worse than this. Many of the facts about me that made my life chances different from those of the people she was imagining were the very same facts that made me likely to be offered things on their behalf. If I had grown up in such a community, we probably wouldn’t have been on the phone together.

Many aspects of our social system serve as filtering mechanisms, determining which interactions happen and between whom, and thus which social patterns people are in a position to observe. For the majority of the 20th century, the U.S. quota system of immigration made legal immigration with a path to citizenship almost exclusively available to Europeans (earning Hitler’s regard as the obvious “leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigration”). But the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act opened up immigration possibilities, with a preference for “skilled labour”.

My parents’ qualification as skilled labourers does much to explain their entry into the country and the subsequent class advantages and monetary resources (such as wealth) that I was born into. We are not atypical: the Nigerian-American population is one of the country’s most successful immigrant populations (what no one mentions, of course, is that the 112,000 or so Nigerian-Americans with advanced degrees is utterly dwarfed by the 82 million Nigerians who live on less than a dollar a day, or how the former fact intersects with the latter). The selectivity of immigration law helps explain the rates of educational attainment of the Nigerian diasporic community that raised me, which in turn helps explain my entry into the exclusive Advanced Placement and Honours classes in high school, which in turn helps explain my access to higher education...and so on, and so on.

It is easy, then, to see how this deferential form of standpoint epistemology contributes to elite capture at scale. The rooms of power and influence are at the end of causal chains that have selection effects. As you get higher and higher forms of education, social experiences narrow – some students are pipelined to PhDs and others to prisons. Deferential ways of dealing with identity can inherit the distortions caused by these selection processes.

​But it’s equally easy to see locally – in this room, in this academic literature or field, in this conversation – why this deference seems to make sense. It is often an improvement on the epistemic procedure that preceded it: the person deferred to may well be better epistemically positioned than the others in the room. It may well be the best we can do while holding fixed most of the facts about the rooms themselves: what power resides in them, who is admitted.

But these are the last facts we should want to hold fixed. Doing better than the epistemic norms we’ve inherited from a history of explicit global apartheid is an awfully low bar to set. The facts that explain who ends up in which room shape our world much more powerfully than the squabbles for comparative prestige between people who have already made it into the rooms. And when the conversation is about social justice, the mechanisms of the social system that determine who gets into which room often just are the parts of society we aim to address. For example, the fact that incarcerated people cannot participate in academic discussions about freedom that physically take place on campus is intimately related to the fact that they are locked in cages.

Deference epistemology marks itself as a solution to an epistemic and political problem. But not only does it fail to solve these problems, it adds new ones. One might think questions of justice ought to be primarily concerned with fixing disparities around health care, working conditions, and basic material and interpersonal security. Yet conversations about justice have come to be shaped by people who have ever more specific practical advice about fixing the distribution of attention and conversational power. Deference practices that serve attention-focused campaigns (e.g. we’ve read too many white men, let’s now read some people of colour) can fail on their own highly questionable terms: attention to spokespeople from marginalized groups could, for example, direct attention away from the need to change the social system that marginalizes them.

Elites from marginalized groups can benefit from this arrangement in ways that are compatible with social progress. But treating group elites’ interests as necessarily or even presumptively aligned with full group interests involves a political naiveté we cannot afford. Such treatment of elite interests functions as a racial Reaganomics: a strategy reliant on fantasies about the exchange rate between the attention economy and the material economy.

Perhaps the lucky few who get jobs finding the most culturally authentic and cosmetically radical description of the continuing carnage are really winning one for the culture. Then, after we in the chattering class get the clout we deserve and secure the bag, its contents will eventually trickle down to the workers who clean up after our conferences, to slums of the Global South’s megacities, to its countryside.

But probably not.

A fuller and fairer assessment of what is going on with deference and standpoint epistemology would go beyond technical argument, and contend with the emotional appeals of this strategy of deference. Those in powerful rooms may be “elites” relative to the larger group they represent, but this guarantees nothing about how they are treated in the rooms they are in. After all, a person privileged in an absolute sense (a person belonging to, say, the half of the world that has secure access to “basic needs”) may nevertheless feel themselves to be consistently on the low end of the power dynamics they actually experience. Deference epistemology responds to real, morally weighty experiences of being put down, ignored, sidelined, or silenced. It thus has an important non-epistemic appeal to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups: it intervenes directly in morally consequential practices of giving attention and respect.

The social dynamics we experience have an outsize role in developing and refining our political subjectivity, and our sense of ourselves. But this very strength of standpoint epistemology – its recognition of the importance of perspective – becomes its weakness when combined with deferential practical norms. Emphasis on the ways we are marginalized often matches the world as we have experienced it. But, from a structural perspective, the rooms we never needed to enter (and the explanations of why we can avoid these rooms) might have more to teach us about the world and our place in it. If so, the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology actually prevents “centring” or even hearing from the most marginalized; it focuses us on the interaction of the rooms we occupy, rather than calling us to account for the interactions we don’t experience. This fact about who is in the room, combined with the fact that speaking for others generates its own set of important problems (particularly when they are not there to advocate for themselves), eliminates pressures that might otherwise trouble the centrality of our own suffering – and of the suffering of the marginalized people that do happen to make it into rooms with us.

The dangers with this feature of deference politics are grave, as are the risks for those outside of the most powerful rooms. For those who are deferred to, it can supercharge group-undermining norms. In Conflict is Not Abuse, Sarah Schulman makes a provocative observation about the psychological effects of both trauma and felt superiority: while these often come about for different reasons and have very different moral statuses, they result in similar behavioural patterns. Chief among these are misrepresenting the stakes of conflict (often by overstating harm) or representing others’ independence as a hostile threat (such as failures to “centre” the right topics or people). These behaviours, whatever their causal history, have corrosive effects on individuals who perform them as well as the groups around them, especially when a community’s norms magnify or multiply these behaviours rather than constraining or metabolizing them.

For those who defer, the habit can supercharge moral cowardice. The norms provide social cover for the abdication of responsibility: it displaces onto individual heroes, a hero class, or a mythicized past the work that is ours to do now in the present. Their perspective may be clearer on this or that specific matter, but their overall point of view isn’t any less particular or constrained by history than ours. More importantly, deference places the accountability that is all of ours to bear onto select people – and, more often than not, a hyper-sanitized and thoroughly fictional caricature of them.

The same tactics of deference that insulate us from criticism also insulate us from connection and transformation. They prevent us from engaging empathetically and authentically with the struggles of other people – prerequisites of coalitional politics. As identities become more and more fine-grained and disagreements sharper, we come to realize that “coalitional politics” (understood as struggle across difference) is, simply, politics. Thus, the deferential orientation, like that fragmentation of political collectivity it enables, is ultimately anti-political.

Deference rather than interdependence may soothe short-term psychological wounds. But it does so at a steep cost: it can undermine the epistemic goals that motivate the project, and it entrenches a politics unbefitting of anyone fighting for freedom rather than for privilege, for collective liberation rather than mere parochial advantage.

How would a constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice differ from a deferential approach? A constructive approach would focus on the pursuit of specific goals or end results rather than avoiding “complicity” in injustice or adhering to moral principles. It would be concerned primarily with building institutions and cultivating practices of information-gathering rather than helping. It would focus on accountability rather than conformity. It would calibrate itself directly to the task of redistributing social resources and power rather than to intermediary goals cashed out in terms of pedestals or symbolism. It would focus on building and rebuilding rooms, not regulating traffic within and between them – it would be a world-making project: aimed at building and rebuilding actual structures of social connection and movement, rather than mere critique of the ones we already have.

#### Ethical responsibility to stop extinction—human beings are ends in themselves—extinction outweighs ontology

Michelis, 17—University of Turin (Angela, “The roots of human responsibility,” Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 29, n. 46, p. 307-333, jan./abr. 2017, dml)

The common elements making both phenomena paradigmatic and original are retraceable, according to Jonas, through the concepts of “totality”, “continuity” and “future” in relation to the existence and happiness of human beings. Human beings, like all other living beings, are ends in themselves; however, only human beings are able to carry out strategies which safeguard their being ends in themselves. Therefore, their very capacity for action implies an objective obligation in the form of external responsibility. For these reasons they can be defined as moral beings; that is, as capable of carrying out morally responsible or morally irresponsible behaviours33. Jonas reaffirms in any case that the archetype of every responsibility is that of human beings for human beings, in which the subject-object connection in the relationship of responsibility is irrefutable, and through this the responsibility for every living thing becomes clear.

The totality of responsibility may be characterized by the paradigmatic examples of parents and of the statesman, which combine as the opposite poles of the greatest particularity and the greatest generality. In particular, the educational sphere demonstrates how the responsibility of parents and of the State are related, and how the private and public spheres integrate reciprocally, encompassing all aspects of the life of human beings. As Jonas describes,

the education of the child includes socialization, beginning with speech and progressing with the transmission of the entire code of societal convictions and norms, through whose appropriation the individual becomes a member of the wider community. The private opens itself essentially to the public and includes it in its own completeness as belonging to the being of the person. In other words, the ‘citizen’ is an immanent aim of education, thus a part of parental responsibility, and this not only by force of the state’s enjoining it. From the other side, just as the parents educate their children ‘for the state’ (if for much more as well), so does the state assume responsibility for the education of the young. The earliest phase is left in most societies to the home, but everything after that comes under the supervision, regulation, and aid of the state – so that one can speak of a public ‘educational policy’.34

The continuity of responsibility depends on its own very nature since, for example, neither the care of parents nor the care of the government can cease, as they must respond to the ever new needs of life, which is rooted in the past and moves towards the future. Of course, political responsibility is greater in both temporal directions in relation to the greater duration of the historical community with respect to individual existence.

Responsibility is projected beyond the present and today’s care into the future, despite life’s unpredictability; therefore, responsibility must have the function of making possible more than determining the present. Jonas writes:

The object’s self-owned futurity is the truest futural aspect of the responsibility, which thus makes itself the guardian of the very source of that irksome unpredictability in the fruits of its labors. Its highest fulfillment, which it must be able to dare, is its abdication before the right of the never anticipated, which emerges as the outcome of its care […] In the light of such self-transcending width, it becomes apparent that responsibility as such is nothing else but the moral complement to the ontological constitution of our temporality35.

Thus, every total responsibility, such as that of a parent or that of statesman or stateswoman – beyond its specific and important duties – is always also the preservation of the future possibility of responsible actions and of politics itself.

Jonas affirms that by means of the difficult journey through the various regions of responsibility, he also found the answer to the question that at the beginning seemed to represent “the critical point of moral theory”: how to transform the will into the “ought”.

The transition is mediated by the phenomenon of power in its uniquely human sense, in which causal force joins with knowledge and freedom. [...] Only in man is power emancipated from the whole through knowledge and arbitrary will and only in man can it become fatal to him and to itself, his capacity is his fate, and it increasingly becomes the general fate. In him, therefore, and in him alone, there arises out of the willing itself the ‘ought’ as the self-control of his consciously exercised power36.

Human beings, as an epiphenomenon of nature capable of determining for itself the aims of actions and to carry them out autonomously, have reached even within nature the point at which their own self-destruction is possible. This imposes upon them the duty to pay special attention to not destroying, through irresponsible use, what exists, what has come about, and all the other living things, which are somehow in their power. Therefore, it is clear that, at the present time, human power not only requires the union of will and obligation, but also undeniably places responsibility at the centre of morality.

Ethics and politics are necessarily interwoven, and Hans Jonas – in a situation where survival is threatened, of emergency, owing to the exponential development of technological power, and in the conviction that human beings cannot adapt themselves to everything – declares: “For the moment, all work on the ‘true’ [hu]man must stand back behind the bare saving of its precondition, namely, the existence of [hu]mankind in a sufficient natural environment”37.

Responsible politics turns towards the future with the consciousness that it must guarantee the very possibility of responsible action and the existence of future generations, as well as the right to life of the world. It urges a limitation of technological development and the pursuit of a moderate and equitable use of resources.